

JENNA ANDERS

jennaanders@berkeley.edu

703-346-4289

<https://jenna-anders.github.io>

Academic Positions *Assistant Professor of Public Policy and Economics, 2025-*
University of Virginia, Batten School of Leadership and Public Policy

S.V. Ciriacy-Wantrup Postdoctoral Fellow, 2024-2025
University of California-Berkeley, Agricultural and Resource Economics

Education **Harvard University**
Ph.D. Economics, 2018 to 2024
Harvard Environmental Economics Program Pre-Doctoral Fellow

Brown University
B.A. Economics (honors), Environmental Studies, 2016

Fields Primary: Public Economics, Environmental Economics
Secondary: Labor Economics

Working Papers **“The Gorilla in the Closet: Regulatory Enforcement Under Federalism”** (with Romaine Campbell)

How does federal regulatory capacity affect state enforcement outcomes? In this paper, we provide a model in which a stronger federal regulatory agency can either strengthen or weaken states' negotiating position with their regulated entities. The optimal federal enforcement for the states is one that maximizes state-level negotiated penalties. We apply this in the context of environmental regulation to test whether the EPA's enforcement is too strong or too lenient in two environmental programs. First, using an EPA database of state-issued penalties, we show that when EPA's budget was cut in 2011, state penalties for Clean Air Act violations shrank by 15%. Second, using a dataset with information about environmental remediation projects under California state jurisdiction, we show that firms are more likely to begin cleanup projects during Democratic federal administrations. Our remediation analysis identifies the mechanism: while firm cleanup behavior is affected by EPA strength, cleanups conducted by the state are not, providing evidence that the effects operate through firm-state bargaining. We conclude that over one-third of EPA's effect on environmental penalties is through its spillovers to state outcomes, and that states would benefit from a stronger EPA.

“The Welfare Effects of Eligibility Expansions: Theory and Evidence from SNAP” (with Charlie Rafkin), 2024. Conditionally accepted at *American Economic Journal: Economic Policy*.

We study the U.S. rollout of eligibility expansions in the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program. Using administrative data from the U.S. Department of Agriculture, we show that expanding eligibility raises enrollment among the inframarginal (always-eligible) population. Using an online experiment and an administrative survey, we find evidence that information frictions, rather than stigma, drive the new take-up. To interpret our findings, we develop a general model of the optimal eligibility threshold for welfare programs with incomplete take-up. Given our empirical results and certain modeling assumptions, the SNAP eligibility threshold is lower than optimal.

Work in Progress **“Social Disconnection and the Missing Market”** (with Amanda Pallais)

“Welfare Analyses of Firm-Based Government Policies” (with Valerie Chuang, Nathaniel Hendren, and Eric Zwick)

Fellowships & Awards National Science Foundation Graduate Research Fellowship, 2018-2023

Teaching Using Big Data to Solve Economic and Social Problems, Harvard University, teaching fellow for Professor Raj Chetty, 2022
Labor Market Analysis, Harvard University, teaching fellow for Professor Lawrence Katz, 2021

Research Research Assistant, Harvard University, Professor Amanda Pallais, 2016-2018

Academic Service Referee, *Journal of Public Economics*
Referee, *Quarterly Journal of Economics*
Referee, *Journal of Urban Economics*
MOOC creator, Pathways to Research and Doctoral Careers (PREDOC) Consortium
Co-organizer, Harvard Labor/Public Finance Workshop, 2021-2022

Research Grants Chae Family Economics Research Fund, Harvard, 2022
Mind, Brain, and Behavior, Harvard, 2020
The Lab for Economic Applications and Policy (LEAP), Harvard, 2020
Foundations of Human Behavior, Harvard, 2019
Warburg Foundation, Harvard, 2019